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Dezzani v. Kern & Assocs. Ltd., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (Mar. 1, 2018)1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: ATTORNEYS AS AGENTS UNDER NRS 116.31183
Summary
The Court determined that attorneys do not qualify as agents for the purposes of retaliatory
action under NRS 116.31183 where the attorney is providing legal service for a homeowners’
association. The Court further held that an attorney litigating pro se or representing his or her law
firm may not collect attorney fees but may collect attorney costs.
Background
David and Rochelle Dezzani own a condo in Incline Village, Nevada. The Dezzanis, as
well as all other unit owners, are members of the McCloud Condominium Homeowners’
Association (HOA). Gayle Kern and her firm (Kern & Associates) represent the HOA. When the
Dezzanis bought the condo, it had a deck extension that the previous owner had installed. The
previous owner had received permission to install the deck extension from the HOA board in 2002.
The HOA issued the Dezzanis a notice of violation stating that their extended deck
protruded into common area and thus violated the HOA’s CC&Rs. After the Dezzanis responded
to the notice of violation, Kern contacted them. Kern stated that she represented the HOA and
restated the HOA’s position on the deck extension. The Dezzanis challenged the notice of
violation. The HOA board held a hearing and ultimately upheld the notice of violation.
The Dezzanis filed a complaint against Kern and other parties. The complaint stated that
Kern retaliated against them based on NRS 116.31183. The Dezzanis alleged that Kern retaliated
against them because they requested that the HOA retain new legal representation. The Dezzanis
allege that Kern retaliated against them because they asked the HOA to retain new counsel. Kern
filed a 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. The Court granted Kern’s motion and awarded her attorney
costs and fees. The Dezzanis appealed.
Discussion
The Court noted that NRS 116.31183 allows for a separate action when an HOA’s agent
takes certain retaliatory action against a unit’s owner.2 The Court therefore determined that the key
question was whether an attorney qualified as an agent under this section.
The district court did not err in dismissing Dezzanis’ complaint
The Court stated that it reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. To this end, the
Court will first consider the statute’s plain meaning. The Court also noted that it has a duty to first
try to read statutes in a way that renders them consistent with other statutes.
The Court noted that the word “agent” was not defined anywhere in NRS chapter 116.
However, NRS 116.31164 uses the words agent and attorney distinctly.3 The Court took this to
mean that the Legislature meant to distinguish between the two. Since provisions in NRS Chapter
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16 use attorney and agent distinctly, the Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to include
attorneys within the definition of agents under NRS 116.31183.
The Court noted that the dissent would have it ignore the rules of statutory interpretation
that instructs the Court to begin by applying the words’ plain meaning. The dissent would have it
begin by applying rules of grammar and punctuation. However, grammar and punctuation rules
are only to be used when the result is clearly consistent with legislative intent. The Court further
raised an issue with the dissent’s reading of the word “or.” The Court noted that it is instructed to
read “or” disjunctively unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. While the dissent argued
that the word “or” should be read as including “attorney” as a subset of “agents,” the Court noted
that absent clear intent by Congress to not intend “or” be read disjunctively, it would not assign
controlling weight to a comma. The Court then argued that given the dissent’s reading of the
statute, attorneys should always be considered a subcategory of agent. However, it is noted that
Chapter 16 frequently uses the words attorney and agent distinctly when attempting to address
responsibilities applicable to agents but not to attorneys.
The Court also rejected the argument that attorneys should be included as a subset of agents
under NRS 116.31183 as a matter of public policy. The Court relied on the unique nature of the
attorney-client relationship that distinguishes it from a typical agent-principal relationship. The
Court noted that the attorney-client relationship is an agent-principal relationship for the purpose
of determining whether a client is responsible for the actions of an attorney. However, the Court
noted that such liability is different from imposing liability on an attorney for adverse actions taken
against a third party in representing a client. The Court noted that attorneys generally owe no duty
to adverse third parties when acting solely as legal representation. Further, the attorney-client
relationship is subject to strict ethical standards. The Court also noted that there is a long history
of courts treating attorney-client relationships differently from typical agent-principal
relationships based on factual differences. Given these factors, the Court declined to include
attorneys as a subset of agents under NRS § 116.31183. Therefore, there can be no liability for
retaliatory actions under NRS § 116.31183 against an attorney where the alleged retaliatory act is
providing legal representation for a client.
The district court erred in awarding Kern attorney fees
The Court noted that the district court awarded attorney fees to Kern under NRS
18.010(2)(b) and as sanctions under NRCP 11 because it found that the Dezzanis’ lawsuit was
filed for the purpose of harassing Kern. The Court noted that it reviews a district court’s award of
attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. The Court has consistently held that attorneys who proceed
pro se or represent their law firm, they cannot be awarded attorney fees. This is because there are
no fees to award. The Court cites Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court for the proposition that
attorneys fees generally cannot be awarded to pro se attorney litigants.4 The Court held that was
not the case here. However, the Court did uphold the district court’s award of costs on the ground
that Kern incurred actual financial costs in representing herself.
Conclusion
In NRS 116.31183, the word “agent” does not include attorneys who are providing legal
representation for a client. Therefore, an attorney who is merely legally representing their client
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cannot be held liable for retaliatory conduct under NRS 116.1183. Further, attorney pro se litigants
who represent themselves or their law firm may not be awarded attorney fees they did not actually
incur, but may be awarded costs. The Court upheld in part and overturned in part the district court’s
ruling.
Dissent
Justice Pickering argued that attorneys are agents, and therefore can potentially face
liability under NRS 116.31183. After noting that NRS 116.31183 is silent as to the meaning of the
word “agent,” the dissent turned its attention to NRS 116.31164. While the majority opinion read
the “or” between the words “attorney” and “agent” as disjunctive, the dissent argued that such a
reading assumes more than can be supported. The dissent argued that an attorney is universally
understood to be an agent. The dissent further points to legislative history that it believes supports
the notion that the Legislature intended to include attorneys within its definition of the word
“agent” for the purposes of this statute. The dissent argued that this case therefore should not have
been dismissed.
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